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MAD COWS, OFFENDED EMUS, AND OLD EGGS:
PERISHABLE PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT LAWS
AND FREE SPEECH
Lisa Dobson Gould
Abstract: In the wake of the 1989 controversy over Alar use on apples, several states
enacted laws providing a civil cause of action to producers damaged by false statements
disparaging the safety of their perishable food products. Commentators have suggested that
these laws are unconstitutional and contrary to the First Amendment's free speech protections.
This Comment argues that the majority of state laws either meet or exceed the constitutional
protections established by the U.S. Supreme Court's defamation cases. However, these laws
are unlikely to be used widely in the future because of their stringent proof requirements and
because such suits often create greater public awareness of the disparaging statements the
plaintiff seeks to redress.
Since 1991, twelve states have enacted statutes allowing producers of
perishable food products to sue persons who disseminate false statements
about the safety of their products.' Although commentators argue that
these laws may violate First Amendment free speech protections,2 no
court has yet determined their constitutionality.3
To date, three product disparagement actions have been brought under
the state statutes. In the first statutory product disparagement suit to
reach trial, Texas ranchers sued Oprah Winfrey, her television show, and
a guest who claimed that much of the American beef supply was likely
infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or "mad cow
1. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., David J. Bederman et al., Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The
Constitutionality ofAgricultural Disparagement Statutes, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 135 (1997); Megan
IV. Semple, Comment, Veggie Libel Meets Free Speech: A Constitutional Analysis of Agricultural
Disparagement Lmvs, 15 Va. Envtl. L.J. 403, 428 (1995-96); Julie J. Srochi, Comment, Must
Peaches Be Preserved at All Costs? Questioning the Constitutional Validity of Georgia's Perishable
Product Disparagement Law, 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1223, 1233 (1996); Eric M. Stahl, Comment,
Can Generic Products Be Disparaged? The "Of and Concerning" Requirement After Alar and the
New Crop of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 517 (1996). The First
Amendment applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 749
n.1 (1976).
3. Publishers of environmental newsletters challenged the constitutionality of Georgia's statute
before any plaintiffs had brought suit under the law, but the state court held that the issue was not yet
ripe for review. See Action for a Clean Env't v. State, 457 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. App. 1995).
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disease."4 Although the statute's constitutionality was raised, the judge
did not directly decide the issue.5 In a second case, emu ranchers sued
Honda over an advertisement that jokingly called emu the "pork of the
future."6 In the third case, egg producers brought a counterclaim against
a public interest group that sued the producers for allegedly re-
packaging, re-dating, and selling eggs that were no longer safe for
consumption.7 The egg producers have since dropped their product
disparagement claim.'
Although the perishable product disparagement laws derive from the
common law tort of product disparagement, they were enacted primarily
in response to the controversy generated by a 1989 television report on
the use of the chemical Alar on apples.' Apple sales plummeted after the
CBS television show "60 Minutes" reported that Alar, which was used
on U.S. apples, was carcinogenic to humans." Apple growers in
Washington State sued CBS on a common law product disparagement
claim, but lost their suit" Both industry and legislative concern over the
4. Clarence Page, 'Veggie Libel' Livs Cast Chill over Free Speech, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 5, 1998,
at A9, available in 1998 WL 4041336.
5. Instead, the judge dismissed the statutory cause of action, forcing the plaintiffs to move forward
under a common law business disparagement claim. Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, No. 2:96-CV-
208-J, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3559, at *19-20 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1998). The judge held that live
cattle did not constitute perishable products and that the plaintiffs had not proven the alleged
disparagement was "knowingly false," as required by the statute. Id. at *13-14 (noting that
"knowingly false" standard "exceeded even the constitutionally required 'actual malice'
standard... established in New York Times"). The Texas ranchers have appealed and filed a second
suit against the same defendants in Texas state court. See Alan Guebert, Who Is Paul Engler and
Why Is He Still Suing Oprah Winfrey?, Peoria J. Star, May 12, 1998, at C2, available in 1998 WL
5764765.
6. See Tim Jones, Oprah Verdict Could Tongue-Tie Her and Others, Chi. Trib., Feb. 16, 1998,
§ 1, at 1; Page, supra note 4.
7. See Vindu P. Goel, Suit Accuses Buckeye of Selling Old Eggs as Fresh, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Mar. 8, 1998, at 15A, available in 1998 WL 4124200; see also Jones, supra note 6.
8. See Vindu P. Goel, Buckeye Egg Farm Drops Suit Against Ohio Consumer Group, Cleveland
Plain Dealer, Jul. 7, 1998, at 2C, available in 1998 WL 4143512.
9. See Barry Schlachter, Texas Suits Pose First Test of Laws Against 'Food Libel,' Oregonian,
Jan. 18, 1998, at A14; see also Bederman, supra note 2, at 135-36; Bruce E.H. Johnson & Susanna
M. Lowy, Does Life Exist on Mars? Litigating Falsity in a Non-"Of and Concerning" World, 12
Comm. Law. 1, 22 (Summer 1994); Semple, supra note 2, at 403-04; Sue Anne Pressley, Amarillo,
Texas, Agog Over Oprah 's Presence, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 19, 1998, at A4, available in
1998 WL 3314470.
10. Schlachter, supra note 9, at A14.
11. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
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economic harm resulting from the Alar controversy led several states to
create a statutory cause of action for perishable product disparagement. 2
The tort of product disparagement consists of the publication of false
statements of fact concerning the plaintiff's property or business that
results in pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.3 The U.S. Supreme Court has
never addressed how product disparagement fits within the scope of First
Amendment jurisprudence, 4 but many lower courts have applied the
Court's First Amendment defamation requirements to product
disparagement cases. 5 Commentators have suggested that product
disparagement laws would not survive constitutional analysis because
they do not conform to constitutional standards for defamation suits. 6
This Comment argues that the majority of the state product
disparagement laws are consistent with First Amendment protections
developed within the context of defamation law and are therefore
constitutional. Part I discusses the differences between the common law
torts of product disparagement and defamation. Part II sets forth the
requirements of the civil causes of action provided in states that have
enacted perishable product disparagement statutes. Part III reviews the
U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment free speech jurisprudence,
which has developed almost exclusively in the area of defamation law.
Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of perishable product
disparagement laws under the Supreme Court's First Amendment
defamation standards and describes the proof requirements of the laws,
which negate the need for additional protections. Part V notes that, while
constitutional, state product disparagement laws are likely to be used
only sparingly in future litigation because of the burdens they place on
potential plaintiffs.
I. THE COMMON LAW ELEMENTS OF PRODUCT
DISPARAGEMENT AND DEFAMATION
Product disparagement and defamation are similar, but distinctly
different torts in terms of their historical development and required
12. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 135-36; Aaron Epstein, 'Oprah' Case to Test Food-Libel
Lmv, Seattle Times, Dec. 29, 1997, at A5.
13. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 623A, 624 (1977); see also J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:103 (4th ed. 1997).
14. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 66.
16. See supra note 2.
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elements of proof under the common law. 17 Both common law torts
required proof of a false negative statement concerning plaintiffs or their
products that were disseminated to third parties."8 One key distinction
between the common law torts of disparagement and defamation is that
disparagement protects plaintiffs' economic interests in property, while
defamation protects plaintiffs' reputational interests and good name. 9
Further, product disparagement historically required plaintiffs to prove
additional elements that defamation did not,2" including fault by the
defendant, falsity of the statement, and resulting pecuniary damages.2'
A. Product Disparagement
Product disparagement is a subcategory within the broader common
law tort of disparagement.2 The earliest cases of disparagement arose in
the late sixteenth century and, although recognized as loosely connected
to defamation,' developed as a completely separate tort.24 The elements
of common law product disparagement included proof that: (1) the
defendant published a statement of fact to a third party, (2) the statement
17. Since 1964. the U.S. Supreme Court has created additional proof requirements for the
common law tort of defamation. See infra Part Ill.A.
18. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation,
Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62
Temp. L. Rev. 903, 914 (1989).
19. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 111, 128, at 777, 964 (5th
ed. 1984).
20. It is possible that a plaintiff could have both a product disparagement and a defamation claim,
such as when a defendant falsely disparages a plaintiff's products while implying that the poor
quality of the products is due to the plaintiff's bad business practices or dishonesty. See, e.g.,
Kollenberg v. Ramirez, 339 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. App. 1983) (holding that as long as damages do not
overlap, where defamation and disparagement overlap plaintiff may bring suit for both). Modernly,
the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has added several proof requirements to
defamation, making defamation much more similar to disparagement than it was under the common
law. See infra Part I.A.
21. See Lisa Magee Arent, Note, A Matter of "'Governing' Importance": Providing Business
Defamation and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First Amendment Protection, 67 Ind. L.J.
441,447 (1992).
22. See Keeton et al., supra note 19, § 128, at 963, 965-67. Product disparagement has gone by
many names, including "slander of title," "slander of goods," "trade libel," "unfair competition," and
more recently, "injurious falsehood." See William L. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of
Liability, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 425 (1959).
23. See Prosser, supra note 22, at 425.
24. Id. at 429 ("Nothing is better settled... than that the action for injurious falsehood,
notwithstanding the cognomen of 'slander of title,' is in no way derived or descended from, or
related to, the defamation actions for libel and slander.").
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was false, (3) the statement was understood to refer to the plaintiff's
goods or services and to disparage their quality, (4) the defendant made
the statement maliciously, and (5) the statement was a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiff pecuniary loss (or special damages)."
While both torts required dissemination of a disparaging statement,
product disparagement had more stringent proof requirements under the
common law. Falsity was not presumed under common law
disparagement; thus, the plaintiff had to prove an allegedly disparaging
statement false.26 Courts also generally required product disparagement
plaintiffs to show some degree of fault, either by proving malice where a
privilege existed or by proving an absence of any privilege to make the
disparaging remark. 7 A privilege under the common law essentially
provided a qualified excuse from liability.28
B. Defamation
Common law defamation encompasses the "twin torts" of libel and
slander, both of which require the dissemination of false and negative
statements concerning a plaintiff.29 Defamation is commonly defined as a
statement that "tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided," or an injury to
personal reputation that involves disgrace. 0 Unlike disparagement,
defamation arose out of efforts by the secular and ecclesiastical courts of
England to punish what was seen as a sin and was never viewed as a
property-based crime under the common law."
Prior to 1964, defamation was a strict liability tort and was relatively
easy for plaintiffs to prove. Plaintiffs were not required to prove any fault
on the part of a defendant with regard to the truth or falsity of a
25. 9 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 33.2, at 1015-16 (1992); see also
Restatement, supra note 13, §§ 623A, 624.
26. See Langvardt, supra note 18, at 916.
27. See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 920-21 (4th ed. 1971); Langvardt,
supra note 18, at 916; Prosser, supra note 22, at 429, 43 1.
28. One example of a qualified privilege under the common law was the privilege of "fair
comment," which excused from liability comment about public officers or employees regarding
matters of public concern. Prosser, supra note 27, at 819.
29. See Langvardt, supra note 18, at 907.
30. Prosser, supra note 27, at 739.
31. Keeton et al., supra note 19, § I 11, at 772; R.C. Donnelly, History ofDefamation, 1949 Wis.
L. Rev. 99 (1949); Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3
Colum. L. Rev. 546 (1903).
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statement. As a result, defamation defendants could be held liable even
if they had a good faith belief in the truth of their statements.33 Moreover,
common law defamation required no proof of actual damages, but
allowed for presumed damages upon proof of defamation.34 The only
limit placed upon liability for common law defamation, other than the
assertion of privilege,35 was a requirement that the defamatory meaning
and its reference to the plaintiff be conveyed to and understood by
others.3 ' None of the more stringent proof requirements of product
disparagement regarding fault, falsity, and damages applied to common
law defamation.37
II. STATE PERISHABLE PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT LAWS
Twelve states reacted to the 1989 Alar controversy3" by enacting laws
codifying the common law tort of product disparagement.3 ' Louisiana
enacted the first of these statutes in 1991.40 All but one of these state laws
protect against harm caused by disparaging statements about a type of
product, as opposed to statements directed against a specific producer's
32. Langvardt, supra note 18, at 909.
33. Id. at 909-10; see also Keeton et al., supra note 19, § 111, at 772-73.
34. See Langvardt, supra note 18. at 911.
35. Id. at911-13.
36. See Prosser, supra note 27, at 773.
37. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
39. The twelve states are: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. See Ala. Code §§ 6-5-620 to 6-5-625
(Supp. 1997); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113 (West Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 865.065 (Vest
1997); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 2-16-1 to 2-16-4 (Supp. 1998); Idaho Code §§ 6-2001 to 6-2003 (1997);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 4501 to 4504 (West Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 69-1-251, 69-1-253,
69-1-255, 69-1-257 (Supp. 1998); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-44-01 to 32-44-04 (Supp. 1997); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.81 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, §§ 361b, 3010,
3011, 3012 (West Supp. 1998); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 20-10A-1 to 20-10A-4 (Michie 1995); Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 96.001 to 96.004 (West 1997). Unlike the other states, North
Dakota requires a "false and defamatory" statement and calls its civil cause of action "defamation of
agricultural products and management practices" rather than "disparagement." N.D. Cent. Code
§ 32-44-02. One other state, Colorado, does not provide a civil cause of action but does criminalize
product disparagement that unfairly restrains trade or results in the "destruction" of perishable food
products. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 35-3 1-101 (West 1997).
40. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4501.
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product.4" Each of the twelve states provides a civil cause of action for
producers and sometimes other parties involved in the distribution of
perishable agricultural products that suffer damages resulting from the
publication of false and damaging statements regarding the safety of their
food products.42
Few of the statutes address explicitly which party bears the burden of
proof on the elements of the cause of action. Only Idaho and Ohio appear
expressly to place the burden on the plaintiff to prove all elements of a
perishable product disparagement action. 3 Alabama's statute implies that
the burden is on the plaintiff by discussing defenses not available to the
disseminator of the disparaging statement, providing that "[i]t is no
defense... that the actor did not intend, or was unaware of, the act
charged."'  Assuming that courts interpret the other nine statutes
consistently with their common law precursor, plaintiffs also bear the
burden of proof under these laws.45
Each statute varies to some degree on the elements of proof required,
with Idaho's demanding the most stringent standards of proof. Only
Idaho requires a plaintiff to prove each element of the action by "clear
41. Idaho is the only state that requires that the disparaging statement refer to the plaintiff's
product specifically, as opposed to the type of product generally. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
42. Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas allow only producers
harmed by the disparaging statement to sue. Idaho Code Ann. § 6-2003(1); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 4503; Miss. Code Ann. § 69-1-255; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 3012; S.D. Codified Laws § 20-10A-
2; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 96.002(b). Georgia allows any person damaged by the
disparaging statement, including the entire chain from grower to consumer, to sue. Ga. Code Ann.
§§ 2-16-2(3), 2-16-3. Ohio allows producers, distributors, sellers, and associations representing such
parties to sue. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.81(B)(4)-(C). Alabama provides the cause of action to
any person who produces, markets, or sells a perishable product, while North Dakota allows any
"person engaged in growing, raising, distributing, or selling an agricultural product, or
manufacturing the product for consumer use" to sue. Ala. Code § 6-5-622; N.D. Cent. Code § 32-44-
01(1). Arizona allows producers, shippers, or associations representing producers or shippers to sue,
while Florida allows any producer or association representing producers to sue. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 3-113; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 865.065(3).
43. Idaho Code Ann. § 6-2003(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.8 I(C).
44. Ala. Code § 6-5-623.
45. See supra Part I; see also Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d
1131, 1142 (3d Cir. 1977) (following "unanimous view of other jurisdictions that the plaintiff in a
[common law] product disparagement action must bear the burden of proving the falsity of the
disparaging communications"); Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex.
1987) ("More stringent requirements have always been imposed on the 'plaintiff seeking to recover
for injurious falsehood in three important respects-falsity of the statement, fault of the defendant
and proof of damage."') (citation omitted).
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and convincing evidence" and limits recovery to actual pecuniary
damages.46 Idaho also requires that the false disparagement be "of and
concerning" the plaintiff's specific perishable food product and that a
"factual statement regarding a generic group of products, as opposed to a
specific producer's product, shall not serve as the basis for a cause of
action."47 Notably, the statute also provides that "[t]his statutory cause of
action is not intended to abrogate the common law action for product
disparagement or any other cause of action otherwise available."48 These
provisions make it unlikely that product disparagement actions will ever
be brought under the Idaho law, given that it places a higher burden of
proof on plaintiffs and allows for fewer recovery options than the
common law action.49 Each of the remaining eleven state statutes set
forth varying proof standards on the key elements of fault, falsity,
and damages.50
A. Fault
All but one of the twelve state laws expressly require some proof of
fault on the part of the defendant. Only Alabama provides no express
fault standard, but appears to allow negligence or ignorance to suffice as
the standard of fault.5 Five states require a level of fault falling
somewhere between negligence and malice,52 most frequently providing
that the disseminator "knew or should have known" the statement to be
false.53 The remaining six states set the highest standard of fault: malice
or a "knowingly false" statement. 4
46. Idaho Code § 6-2003(2)-(3) (1997).
47. Idaho Code §§ 6-2002(1)(a), 6-2003(4) (1997).
48. Idaho Code § 6-2003(6) (1997).
49. See supra Part L
50. See Appendix, infra.
51. Alabama defines disparagement as "[tlhe dissemination to the public in any manner of false
information that a perishable food product or commodity is not safe for human consumption" and
provides that "[i]t is no defense under this article that the actor did not intend, or was unaware of, the
act charged." Ala. Code §§ 6-5-621, 6-5-623 (Supp. 1997).
52. The U.S. Supreme Court defines malice as the making of a harmful statement "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Courts generally consider the "should have
known" standard to be one of negligence, whereas willfulness probably falls somewhere between
negligence and malice.
53. Florida defines disparagement as the "willful or malicious dissemination to the public in any
manner of any false information" that the protected products are unsafe for human consumption, but
also requires that the disseminator knew or should have known the statement to be false. Fla. Stat.
1026
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B. Falsity
All twelve state laws require the disparaging statement to be false.5
Two of the twelve states allow for a presumption of falsity if the
statement is not based upon reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry,
facts, or data. 6 These* statutes appear to place the initial burden of
showing a lack of scientific basis on the plaintiff and, once that burden is
met, shift the burden to the defendant to prove the truth of the
statement." Only Alabama and Georgia provide that statements will be
"deemed false" if not based upon such scientific information, which
appears to place the initial burden of showing a lack of scientific basis on
the plaintiff, with no rebuttal opportunity for the defendant. 8 The other
eight states neither deem nor presume falsity, but six states define a
Ann. § 865.065(2)(a) (West 1997). Georgia requires that the false statement be disseminated
willfully or maliciously, but does not specify whether the statement must be knowingly false. Ga.
Code Ann. § 2-16-2(1) (Supp. 1998). Louisiana defines disparagement as "dissemination to the
public in any manner of any false information that the disseminator knows or should have known to
be false." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4502(1) (West Supp. 1997). Ohio specifies that to recover damages,
the plaintiff must establish "that the disseminator knew or should have known that the information
was false." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.81(C) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997). Oklahoma similarly
requires that "the disseminator knows or should have known [the statement] to be false." Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 2, § 3012 (%Vest Supp. 1998).
54. Arizona provides that the plaintiff must suffer damages "as a result of malicious public
dissemination of false information" and that the person making the disparaging comment do so "for
the purpose of harming a producer or shipper." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113 (A)-(B) (West Supp.
1997). Idaho requires that the false statement be made with "actual malice, that is, he knew that the
statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Idaho Code § 6-2002(l)(d)
(1997). Mississippi defines disparagement as "dissemination to the public in any manner of any false
information that the disseminator knows to be false." Miss. Code Ann. § 69-1-253(a) (Supp. 1998).
North Dakota requires that the disseminator "willfully or purposefully" makes the false statement
"knowing the statement to be false." N.D. Cent. Code § 32-44-02 (Supp. 1997). South Dakota and
Texas allow for liability only when the disseminator "knows" the information is false. S.D. Codified
Laws § 20-10A-1(2) (Michie 1995); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 96.002(a)(2) (vest 1997).
55. See Ala. Code § 6-5-621(1); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113(A)-(B); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 865.065(2)(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 2-16-2(1); Idaho Code § 6-2002(1); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4502(1);
Miss. Code Ann. § 69-1-253(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-44-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2307.81(B)(l)-(2) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 3012; S.D. Codified
Laws § 20-10A-1(2); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 96.002(a)(2).
56. The two states, Louisiana and Mississippi, still require that the defendant "knows"
(Mississippi) or "knows or should have known" (Louisiana) the statement to be false. La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 4502(1); Miss. Code Ann. § 69-1-253(a).
57. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4502(1); Miss. Code Ann. § 69-1-253(a).
58. Ala. Code § 6-5-621; Ga. Code. Ann. § 2-16-2(1). The Alabama statute also specifically
provides that it is to be construed together with "all laws relating to fraud, criminal mischief,
criminal tampering with property, interruption of or impairing commerce and trade, unlawful trade
practices, and property damage." See Ala. Code § 6-5-625 (Supp. 1997).
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"false statement" as one without basis in reasonable or reliable scientific
data and require that the disseminator knew or should have known the
statement to be false.59 South Dakota does not define "false statement,"
but defines "disparagement" as "any information that the disseminator
knows to be false and that states or implies that an agricultural food
product is not safe for consumption."
60
C. Damages
All the statutes require the plaintiff to be damaged by a false
disparaging remark. None of the laws indicate that anything other than
the common law requirement of pecuniary damage can satisfy this
element.6' Eleven states allow for recovery of damages and "other relief'
not limited to compensatory damages, as allowed by law; only Idaho
limits recovery to actual pecuniary damages. 2 Three states allow treble
damages if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intended to harm the
plaintiff or made the statement with malice.63
III. SUPREME COURT FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
IN DEFAMATION LAW
The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed how First Amendment
standards apply to the tort of product disparagement.' However, the
Court has developed a series of additional proof requirements based on
First Amendment protections of free speech for common law
defamation.65 Many lower courts have applied these requirements to
59. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113(E)(1) (West Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 865.065(2)(a); N.D.
Cent. Code § 32-44-01(5)-(6) (Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.81(B)(2) & (C) (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 3012; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 96.003
(West 1997).
60. S.D. Codified Laws § 20-1OA-1(2).
61. Ala. Code § 6-5-622 (Supp. 1997); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113 (West Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 865.065 (Vest 1997); Ga. Code § 2-16-3 (Supp. 1998); Idaho Code § 6-2002(1)(e) (1997);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4503 (West Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 69-1-255 (Supp. 1998); N.D.
Cent. Code § 32-44-02 (Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.81(C) (Banks-Baldwin Supp.
1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. § 3012 (West Supp. 1998); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-1OA-2 (Michie 1995);
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 96.002(b) (West 1997).
62. See supra note 39.
63. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-44-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.81(E) (Banks-Baldwin Supp.
1997); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-IOA-3 (Michie 1995).
64. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Part III.A.
1028
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product disparagement cases.6 Because of the lack of other precedent,
the Court will likely look to its First Amendment jurisprudence on
defamation when considering the constitutionality of perishable product
disparagement laws.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." '67 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that defamation laws may restrain free
expression "for appropriate reasons."6 However, the Court has
acknowledged varying levels of protection for different categories of
speech, affording the highest protection to speech critical of public
officials or public figures.69 The rationale behind this heightened
protection is the premise that only the free flow of speech in the
"marketplace of ideas" will lead to truth,7" particularly in an area such as
politics, where the line between truth and falsehood may be unclear.7'
Beyond this ultimate protection, the reaches of First Amendment
protections for speech, particularly in the context of disparagement laws,
are less clear and deserve further exploration.7"
With its 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the U.S.
Supreme Court launched a series of decisions that modified the common
law elements of defamation by setting forth new constitutional
protections in the area.74 These decisions balanced a plaintiff's right to
reputational protection against the First Amendment's protection of free
speech. Most importantly, the Court created new proof requirements
66. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990); Simmons Ford, Inc. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Amcor Inv. Corp. v. Cox Ariz.
Publications, 764 P.2d 327 (Ariz. App. 1988); Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal.
1986); Teilhaber Mfg. Co. v. Unarco Materials Storage, 791 P.2d 1164 (Colo. App. 1989).
67. U.S. Const. amend. I.
68. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,360 (1976).
69. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-75 (1964); see also Constitutional
Law 1196-98 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1996).
70. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
72. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev.
245, 255-57 (arguing that First Amendment provides ultimate protection for speech about education,
achievements in philosophy and science, literature and arts, and discussion of public issues), with
Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 26-28 (1971)
(disagreeing with Meiklejohn's extension of First Amendment ultimate protection beyond explicitly
political speech).
73. 376 U.S. 254.
74. See Langvardt, supra note 18, at 923.
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within defamation law, which it viewed as necessary to protect against
the chilling effect such suits might have on speech. Notably, these new
requirements focused on the proof requirements differentiating
defamation and product disparagement: fault, falsity, and actual
damages. Additionally, the Supreme Court's analyses within the
defamation context clarified the extent to which states may restrict
commercial speech.
A. ProofRequirements Added to Defamation by First Amendment
Jurisprudence
1. Fault
In New York Times, the Court held that the First Amendment protects
the press from liability for defamatory statements about a public official
unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant made the statement with
actual malice." The Court defined "actual malice" as knowledge of, or
reckless disregard for, falsity.76 New York Times thus altered common
law defamation by requiring public official plaintiffs to prove a high
level of fault on the part of the defendant--"actual malice'--by clear and
convincing evidence." Importantly, the Court for the first time focused
on the nature of the plaintiff, specifically noting that the plaintiff's status
as a public figure was the key reason for holding the plaintiff to a higher
proof standard for fault. The Court's rationale for this previously
unrecognized protection of defamation defendants was that "erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate," and therefore, "breathing space"
was necessary to protect the public's freedom of expression in criticizing
its own government.78
New York Times was soon followed by a series of decisions
addressing the scope of First Amendment fault requirements for both
public and private defamation plaintiffs. In Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, the Court extended the malice proof requirement to public figures
other than government officials.79 In its plurality opinion in Rosenbloom
75. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
76. Id.
77. In New York Times, the Court required proof with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. The
Court later termed this "clear and convincing proof." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974).
78. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
79. 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
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v. Metromedia, Inc., the Court briefly extended the malice requirement to
private figure plaintiffs in cases involving issues of public interest.8"
The Rosenbloom public interest focus was short-lived. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., the Court rejected the Rosenbloom approach and
created a lesser burden of proof for private figure defamation plaintiffs,
giving no consideration to whether a matter of public interest was
involved.8' The Court noted that a rule falling somewhere between the
actual malice standard of New York Times and the strict liability rule of
common law defamation was more appropriate to private figure
plaintiffs.82 As a result, the Court established that, at a minimum, a
private figure plaintiff must prove negligence on the part of a defamation
defendant.8 However, the Court left states free to set higher fault
standards.84 In so holding, the Court gave no consideration to whether the
defendant's statement pertained to a matter of public interest or
concem." In Gertz, the Court stated that private figures should not be
required to prove actual malice, even when the defendant's statement
pertained to a matter of public concern, because free speech rights do not
always outweigh the valid state interest in compensating victims of
defamatory harm.8
6
The Gertz Court also defined two types of "public" defamation
plaintiffs: one who acquires "such pervasive fame or notoriety that he
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts," and one
who becomes a "limited purpose" public figure by "voluntarily
inject[ing] himself or [being] drawn into a particular public contro-
versy.""7 As compared to public plaintiffs, the Court noted that private
figure plaintiffs should face a lower burden of proof because they have
less access to media channels for counteracting false statements and have
not voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye. 8 Since Gertz, the
80. 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971).
81. 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
82. Id. at 347.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The Gertz Court expressly disapproved of Rosenbloom's public concern approach. Id. at 346.
86. Id. at 341, 352; see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (discussing
"appropriate accommodation between the public's interest in an uninhibited press and its equally
compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utterances").
87. 418U.S.at351.
88. Id. at 344-45.
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Court has indicated that who or what constitutes a "public figure" will be
determined on a case by case basis.8 9
Despite these additional constitutional requirements, the Supreme
Court has not always held defamation statutes containing no apparent or
insufficient fault standards unconstitutional on their face. For example, in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court noted:
The appellant argues that the statute should be declared
unconstitutional on its face if construed by the New York courts to
impose liability without proof of knowing or reckless falsity. Such
a declaration would not be warranted [because t]he New York
Court of Appeals... has been assiduous in construing the statute to
avoid invasion of the constitutional protections of speech and press.
We, therefore, confidently expect that the New York courts will
apply the statute consistently with the constitutional command.9"
This is consistent with the basic rule of statutory construction "that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute
from unconstitutionality."'" Thus, a statutory cause of action that lacks a
sufficient fault standard may withstand constitutional scrutiny if the
state's courts read such an element into the law.
2. Falsity
The Court has forbidden the common law presumption of falsity in
defamation cases, at least where the false statements relate to issues of
public concern. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court
clarified that a public figure plaintiff must prove the falsity of the
statements at issue in order to prevail.92 The Court noted that this
requirement was essential to ensure that true speech on matters of public
89. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979) (holding that researcher was
not public figure by virtue of fact that he received public finds and published in professional
journals); Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 (holding that socialite going through scandalous divorce is not
public figure).
90. 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (citations omitted); see also Posados de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co.,
478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986) ("[I]n reviewing the facial constitutionality of the challenged statute and
regulations, we must abide by the narrowing constructions announced by the Superior Court and
approved sub silentio by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.").
91. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (citation omitted).
92. 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). Hepps, a principal stockholder in a corporation of franchises, sued
when the defendant newspaper published a series of articles linking him to organized crime. Id.
at 769.
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concern would not be deterred.93 Thus, the Court indicated that the public
concern theme rejected in Gertz in addressing fault is still a factor when
it comes to falsity. Yet, unlike with malice, the Court has not ruled on
whether falsity must be established by clear and convincing evidence.94
Because the Hepps Court expressly limited its holding to private figure
plaintiffs suing for defamation involving issues of public concern, it is
unclear whether a private figure plaintiff suing on a private concern
could still rely on a presumption of falsity.
3. Damages
The Court did not directly address the lack of a damages requirement
under common law defamation until its 1974 decision in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.95 Because common law defamation allowed for both
presumed and punitive damages, the Court noted that further limitation
was required to avoid impermissible chilling of free speech.96 Thus, the
Court held that where a private figure plaintiff proved no more than
negligence, the plaintiff could recover only damages for "actual injury"
as opposed to presumed damages.97 Additionally, private figure plaintiffs
could obtain punitive damages only if they proved actual malice.98
The Court later restricted the Gertz punitive damages rule to
defamation concerning public concerns in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.99 In Greenmoss, the Court held that a private
plaintiff could recover presumed and punitive damages without proving
malice if the defamatory statement concerned an issue of purely private
concern.100 The Court stated that this type of defamatory speech can be
curbed because "[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of
public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful
93. Id. at776-77.
94. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 836 F. Supp. 740, 742 (E.D. Wash. 1993), affd, 67 F.3d 816
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 (1996).
95. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
96. Id. at 349.
97. Id. at 349-50.
98. Id. at 350.
99. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
100. Id. at 761. Greenmoss was a construction company that relied on presumed damages to its
business reputation in suing Dun & Bradstreet for falsely reporting that Greenmoss had declared
bankruptcy. Id. at 751-52. Despite this seemingly commercial setting, the Court viewed the
defamation as concerning an issue of purely private concern. Id. at 761-63.
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dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of
liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press."'' Thus, as
with the falsity element,' the Court has indicated that the public or
private nature of the issue is a consideration in assessing the damages
requirements in a defamation case.
Another aspect of New York Times that relates indirectly to the
allowance of presumed damages under common law defamation is the
Court's recognition of the "of and concerning" requirement. In New York
Times, the Court first enunciated the requirement that defamation
plaintiffs prove that the statement was "of and concerning" themselves,
meaning that the statement specifically referred to, or was interpreted by
others as referring to, the plaintiff. 3 This added proof requirement can
be linked to the Court's concern over the fact that defamation still
allowed for presumed damages at that time."° In Rosenblatt v. Baer, the
Court reiterated the "of and concerning" requirement for defamatory
statements referring to multiple plaintiffs. 5 Both New York Times and
Rosenblatt involved allegedly defamatory statements made about public
officials generally, without specifically referring to the plaintiffs or their
particular government positions.' 6 Both plaintiffs sought presumed,
rather than actual, damages. 7
In Rosenblatt, the Court explained that the "of and concerning"
requirement was necessary because otherwise government officials could
bring personal defamation actions whenever anyone complained about
the government generally. 8 However, this requirement did not
necessarily bar a plaintiff's recovery if the defamatory statement referred
101. Id. at 760.
102. See supra Part lI.A.2.
103. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,288-91 (1964).
104. It was not until Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that the Court curbed the availability of presumed
damages in defamation suits, noting that otherwise common law defamation would pose too great a
danger to free speech. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). In contrast, proof of actual damages would
demonstrate that others interpreted a negative statement to be "of and concerning" a plaintiff. See
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277-78 (discussing need for greater safeguards for free speech in civil
defamation action than in criminal action because former allowed for presumed damages and lesser
burden of proof).
105. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
106. Rosenblatt was a former county administrator of a ski area. Id. at 77. Sullivan was a state
police commissioner. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288.
107. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 82; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277.
108. The Court stated this would be "tantamount to a demand for recovery based on libel of
government." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 83.
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to multiple individuals including the plaintiff. 9 Instead, the Court noted
that "[e]ven if a charge and reference were merely implicit.., but a
plaintiff could show by extrinsic proofs that the statement referred to
him, it would be no defense to a suit by one member of an identifiable
group... that another was also attacked." 10 Under this rationale, proof
of pecuniary damage would likely be appropriate "extrinsic proof' that a
statement was understood to refer to a plaintiff. The Court has not used
the "of and concerning" analysis since New York Times and Rosenblatt,
both of which were decided before the Court recognized additional
constitutional safeguards related to damages in Gertz."'
B. Commercial Speech/Non-Commercial Speech Distinction
Although the Court has created many new First Amendment-based
protections for speech, it has refused to apply many of these protections
where commercial speech is involved. The Court defines "commercial
speech" as speech that primarily "does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction"' 2 and "relate[s] solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.""' 3 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court noted that
commercial speech is not afforded the same degree of protection under
the First Amendment as noncommercial speech." 4 Thus, the Supreme
Court has found that in balancing the First Amendment right to free
speech against the right to protect one's reputation, commercial speech
should receive less weight than other constitutionally guaranteed
expressions." 5
The Court has found commercial speech most amenable to state
regulation when it is harmful or misleading."6 The Court explained that
the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech was premised
109. Id. at 81.
110. Id. at 81-82.
111. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
112. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (citation omitted).
113. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,561 (1980).
114. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
115. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
116. Virginia State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (noting that differences between
commercial and non-commercial speech "suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to
insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information in unimpaired").
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on its informational value to the public, so the government could always
ban deceptive or misleading commercial speech." 7 As a result, the Court
does not protect commercial speech that is deceptive or untrue.
This tolerance of state regulation results from the Court's view of two
characteristics unique to commercial speech: objectiveness and
hardiness."8 The Court views commercial speech as inherently more
objective than non-commercial speech because the commercial speaker
is presumed to have wide knowledge of the subject upon which he or she
speaks and, therefore, the ability to verify its accuracy." 9 The Court also
considers commercial speech to be especially "hardy" because the profit
motive of commercial speakers makes them unlikely to stop advertising
in response to state regulation. E° Moreover, the Supreme Court has
consistently refused to extend First Amendment protections to false or
misleading commercial speech.'
IV. PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT LAWS DO NOT REQUIRE
ADDITIONAL FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether the First Amendment
standards for defamation apply to product disparagement. In Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union,'22 the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding,
that First Amendment defamation standards applied to a product
disparagement action in order to decide a judicial review question.'
117. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
118. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
119. Id.
120. Rawn Howard Reinhard, Note, The Tort of Disparagement and the Developing First
Amendment, 1987 Duke L.J. 727, 736 (1987).
121. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771
("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.... We
foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem.") (citations omitted).
122. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
123. In Bose, the manufacturer of a loudspeaker system sued a consumer reports magazine over
its statements that the manufacturer's product produced sound that "wandered about the room." Id. at
488. The district court ruled that the manufacturer was a "public figure" subject to the actual malice
standard of New York Times, and held that the plaintiff had met that standard. Id. at 491-92. On
appeal, the manufacturer did not contest the lower court's finding that it was a public figure and the
First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 492. The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to
decide whether the standard of review used by the First Circuit was correct. Id. at 493. The Court
stated that "[t]he Court of Appeals entertained some doubt concerning the ruling that the New York
Times rule should be applied to a claim of product disparagement based on a critical review of a
loudspeaker system. We express no view on that ruling .... Id. at 513.
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Without deciding whether New York Times applied in the case before it,
the Court concluded that when New York Times did apply, appellate
judges must independently review whether the record establishes actual
malice with convincing clarity."
Despite the Court's refusal to clarify First Amendment standards for
product disparagement, commentators have argued that the Court's
defamation jurisprudence should apply to perishable product
disparagement cases."m These commentators have suggested that the
statutes are unconstitutional, arguing that the statutes lack a sufficient
fault standard,'26 do not require plaintiffs to prove falsity,'27 and do not
require proof that the statements were "of and concerning" the plaintiff's
product.'28
Contrary to these arguments, analysis of the state laws' proof
requirements demonstrates that the majority are either consistent with
First Amendment protections developed for defamation or negate the
need for additional protections. Both the nature of the product
disparagement plaintiff and the nature of the disparaging speech will
affect the standards of proof to which the plaintiff will be held under any
First Amendment analysis. As a result, it is critical to distinguish
between private and public plaintiffs and commercial and non-
commercial speech when assessing the proof standards to which product
disparagement plaintiffs must be held.
A. State Product Disparagement Laws' Proof Requirements Are
Consistent with First Amendment Defamation Jurisprudence
Regardless of the approach it takes in analyzing the constitutionality
of a state product disparagement law, the Supreme Court's analysis is
124. Id. at 514. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that "[i]t is ironic in the first
place that a constitutional principle which originated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan because of
the need for freedom to criticize the conduct of public officials is applied here to a magazine's false
statements about a commercial loud speaker system." Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
125. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 154; Semple, supra note 2, at 429; Srochi, supra note 2, at
1247; Stahl, supra note 2, at 518-19.
126. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 154; Semple, supra note 2, at 429; Srochi, supra note 2,
at 1241.
127. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 159; Semple, supra note 2, at 429, 438-39; Srochi, supra
note 2, at 1241, 1247.
128. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 160; Semple, supra note 2, at 429; Srochi, supra note 2, at
1241; Stahl, supra note 2, at 531-32.
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likely to be informed by its First Amendment defamation juris-
prudence." 9 Both product disparagement and defamation involve harm-
ful speech. 3°  Moreover, the Court has engrafted constitutional
requirements onto defamation that are identical to many of those already
required under product disparagement.'3 ' The Court's focus in
defamation actions on whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure is
an imprecise fit in the disparagement context because the plaintiff's
product rather than the plaintiff is the object of disparagement. Even so,
lower courts consistently consider the nature of the plaintiff in deciding
product disparagement cases.'32 In addition, consideration of the proof
requirements of common law defamation and the nature of the speech
being proscribed are useful in the context of product disparagement.
1. Fault
The fault standards of the twelve states vary, with all but one clearly
requiring a fault standard consistent with the minimum set by the
Supreme Court in Gertz for private figure plaintiffs. 33 Eleven states
require at least negligence; 134 only Alabama provides no clear fault
requirement. 3 1 Six states indicate that the courts have a choice of
imposing either a negligence or a malice standard by requiring proof that
the defendant either "should have known" or "knew" of the falsity of the
129. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270-71 (D. Mass. 1981);
Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial Falsehood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed
Framework, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 309, 364-65 (1993); Cynthia S. Heckathom, Note, Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.: Extending the New York Times Privilege to Product
Disparagement, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1039, 1054 (1983).
130. See supra Part I.
131. See supra Parts I & III.A. The fact that the North Dakota cause of action is titled "defamation
of agricultural products and management practices," even though it is similar in most respects to the
other state "disparagement" statutes, also suggests that these laws are likely to be viewed as
governed by the First Amendment standards for defamation. See N.D. Cent. Code chs. 32-44 (Supp.
1997).
132. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 836 F. Supp. 740, 742-43 (E.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd, 67 F.3d
816 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 (1996); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742, 746-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp. at 1270-71 (accepting
application of New York Times to product disparagement and citing to other lower courts that have
applied it); Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182-84 (Cal. 1986).
133. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; Appendix, infra.
134. See supra Part ll.A; Appendix, infra.
135. The Alabama statute instead addresses the defenses not available to a product disparagement
defendant. See supra note 51.
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statement.13 6 Five states require a standard of fault that surpasses that
required by New York Times, requiring that the statement be knowingly
false without allowing reckless disregard to suffice.
137
In states accepting either malice or negligence, it is likely that state
courts would require proof of the malice in cases involving public figure
plaintiffs 38 and non-commercial speech. 39  A fundamental rule of
statutory construction is that courts should construe statutes so as to
avoid unconstitutionality. 4 ' Moreover, in many states that have product
disparagement statutes, courts have required defamation plaintiffs to
prove malice whenever a case involves a matter of public concern
regardless of the plaintiff's private or public status. 4 ' Given the
propensity of lower courts to apply defamation precedent to
disparagement,'42 it is likely that state courts would read additional First
Amendment requirements into the state product disparagement laws,
even if the Supreme Court would not.4 3
Some commentators misapply the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence and argue that the New York Times malice standard should
apply to every product disparagement plaintiff because product safety is
always a "public concern."'" Many lower courts have also required
product disparagement plaintiffs to prove malice whenever a case
involves an issue of public concern and have broadly defined what
136. See supra Part II.A; Appendix, infra.
137. See supra note 54; Appendix, infra.
138. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990); Amcor Inv. Corp. v.
Cox Ariz. Publications, 764 P.2d 327, 330 (Ariz. App. 1988); Teilhaber Mfg. Co. v. Unarco
Materials Storage, 791 P.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Colo. App. 1989); see also Reinhard, supra note 120,
at 733.
139. Non-commercial speech refers to all speech that does not meet the U.S. Supreme Court's
definition of commercial speech: speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction
and which is solely in the speaker's economic interests. See supra notes 112-13 and accomp-
anying text.
140. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Medical Lab. Consultants v. American Broad. Cos., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D.
Ariz. 1996); Romero v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 648 So. 2d 866, 870 (La. 1995); A & B-Abell
Elevator Co., Inc. v. Columbus/Central Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283,
1295 (Ohio 1995); see also supra note 138.
142. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
143. This is particularly likely in Arizona, where a federal district court expressly stated that
common law disparagement is subject to the same First Amendment requirements as defamation. See
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (In re American Continental/Lincoln Sav.
& Loan Sec. Litig.), 884 F. Supp. 1388, 1396 (D. Ariz. 1995).
144. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 151-52; Semple, supra note 2, at 436.
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constitutes a matter of public concern. 4 ' For example, one court held that
an article about an allegedly defective windshield repellant was an issue
of public concern and thus required the plaintiff to prove actual malice. 4 '
This "public concern" argument ignores the fact that the Supreme Court
rejected a pure public concern focus and, instead, based its fault analysis
on a case-by-case consideration of the public or private nature of the
plaintiff.4 7 While the Court has considered whether an issue of public
concern was involved in addressing the elements of falsity and damages,
it has rejected the public concern analysis when addressing the standard
of fault.
48
It would be incorrect to subject all product disparagement plaintiffs to
the malice standard by arguing that producers of products become
"public figures" by placing their products into the stream of commerce.
This focus on the public/private status of the defamation plaintiff is more
difficult to apply in the disparagement context because the plaintiff's
product, rather than the plaintiff, is the target of the disparaging
statement. 49 As a result, it is unclear whether the analysis should focus
on the producer of the product as a public figure or on the product itself
as a "public product." The latter approach treads dangerously close to
reprising the public concern theme rejected in Gertz.' ° Thus, a focus on
the status of the product disparagement plaintiff remains most consistent
with the Court's precedent in the defamation context.
Even if the public/private figure analysis is used, many disparagement
plaintiffs would qualify as private figures. This is largely because many
product disparagement plaintiffs would not meet the public figure criteria
set forth in Gertz by either (1) having pervasive fame or notoriety in all
contexts, or (2) voluntarily injecting themselves or being drawn into a
145. See. e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 1990); Dairy Stores, Inc. v.
Sentinel Publ'g Co., 516 A.2d 220, 230 (N.J. 1986) (spring water disparaged). But see Bruno &
Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 592 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiff's
status as manufacturer does not require application of actual malice standard to criticism of boat
safety).
146. Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1056.
147. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text; see also Vegod Corp. v. American Broad.
Cos., 603 P.2d 14, 18 (Cal. 1980) (holding, in corporate defamation suit, that "[w]hile availability of
goods for sale and their quality are matters of public interest, this is not the test. The public interest
test was expressly rejected in Gertz .. ") (citations omitted).
148. See supra Parts III.A. 1-.3.
149. See supra Part I.
150. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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particular public controversy.' For example, a farmer who sells his or
her products in a single community and does no advertising would not
meet the Gertz criteria for a public figure if a nationwide controversy
arose, particularly if the farmer did not initiate the controversy. Even
with larger producers, if the plaintiffs are not household names and do
not initiate the controversy out of which the disparaging statements
originate, they could still fall outside the Gertz criteria for public figure
plaintiffs. 52 If statutory product disparagement plaintiffs are viewed as
private figures, the states have discretion to set the standard of fault for
these causes of action at negligence.
Even if the malice standard of New York Times were applied to all
product disparagement plaintiffs, state court interpretation could save
those state laws providing for a lower standard. The Court has noted that
if state courts interpret state law as consistent with constitutional
requirements, great deference will be given to that interpretation."' Thus,
the state perishable product disparagement laws that currently contain a
negligence fault standard would not be automatically void should the
Supreme Court decide to require all product disparagement plaintiffs to
prove malice.
2. Falsity
Unlike its fault analysis, the Supreme Court has considered whether
defamatory statements involved an issue of public or private concern
when assessing the falsity requirement.154  All twelve product
disparagement statutes require the plaintiff to prove that the disparaging
statement was false in order to prevail.' However, two statutes presume
falsity if there is no scientific support for the statement, 56 and two other
statutes deem the statement false when no scientific support exists. 7
Most of the states that do not have a presumption or deeming clause
define a false statement as one not based on reliable scientific data or
151. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
152. Id; see also supra note 89; Modem Prods., Inc. v. Schwartz, 734 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D.
Wis. 1990) (holding that plaintiff producer of health food product disparaged by book publisher is
not public figure).
153. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Part III.A.2.
155. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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inquiry.' 8 The presumption or deeming of falsity raises the question of
whether these states fall below the requirement that the plaintiff must
bear the burden of proving falsity established in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.'59
The four states allowing a presumption or deeming of falsity do not
fall below the Hepps standard because they still require the plaintiff to
make an initial showing of falsity. The four states that presume or deem
falsity do not initially place the burden of proving truth on the defendant,
but rather create a mechanism for shifting the burden of proof.6 The
state presumptions or deeming provisions are also based on the same
type of evidence a court would look to in drawing an inference of
falsity.'6' Thus, it is likely that these burden shifting clauses do not
conflict with the Supreme Court's requirement that the plaintiff bear the
burden of proving falsity.
3. Damages
Unlike common law defamation, the state product disparagement
statutes appear to require proof of pecuniary damages proximately
caused by the defendant's disparagement. 6z As a result, there is no basis
for requiring additional First Amendment protections related to the
damages element for disparagement defendants. This is particularly true
of the indirectly related "of and concerning" requirement the Court
enunciated for public official plaintiffs in New York Times and
Rosenbloom. First, it is unclear if this requirement applies to plaintiffs
who are not public officials.' 63 Second, it is obvious that consumers
158. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
159. 475 U.S. 767 (1986); see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
160. The states that provide only a presumption appear to require the plaintiff to show that no
scientific evidence supports the statement, after which the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
The states that deem falsity after a showing of no scientific support do not appear to give the
defendant a rebuttal opportunity, but they do require the plaintiff to prove that no scientific evidence
supports the disparaging statement. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 67 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing
plaintiffs' common law disparagement case because they did not meet their burden of proving
falsity, noting that plaintiffs "offered evidence showing that no studies have been conducted to test
the relationship between ingestion of [Alar] and incidence of cancer in humans. Such evidence,
however, is insufficient .... Animal laboratory tests are a legitimate means for assessing cancer
risks to humans.").
162. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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understood a disparaging statement to be "of and concerning" a
plaintiff's product where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
disparaging statement proximately caused pecuniary damage."6
At the time of the New York Times and Rosenbloom cases, which are
the only cases addressing this requirement, defamation plaintiffs were
able to move forward without proof of actual damages.' 65 In response,
the Court required evidence indicating that a defamatory reference was
interpreted by others as referring to the plaintiff, noting that it would
suffice if "a plaintiff could show by extrinsic proofs that the statement
referred to him."' 66 Pecuniary damages proximately caused by a
disparaging statement are obvious extrinsic proof that others interpreted
a disparagement as pertaining to a plaintiff's product. If customers do
not interpret disparaging statements to refer to a producer's product, then
the producer will be unable to prove that the disparagement caused his or
her loss of business. As a result, the Supreme Court's previous concern
over allowing recovery based on a disparagement not clearly directed at
the plaintiff, where harm was presumed, is unwarranted in the context of
the state laws because they all appear to require proof of pecuniary
damages.
Moreover, all the state statutes clearly define what the disparaging
statement must be "of and concerning"-a perishable product owned or
distributed by an individual who is damaged by the disparaging
statement. 67 Additionally, courts addressing common law claims have
allowed generic disparaging statements about a class of products, rather
than a specific person's product, where it was conceivable that third
parties interpreted the statement as including a reference to the plaintiff's
product. 6 For example, in Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," the alleged
164. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also United Med. Lab., Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding economic effect on business of
negative publicity probative of whether unidentified class member impugned).
165. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
166. For full quote, see text accompanying supra note 110.
167. See Appendix, infra; see also Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.
Wash. 1992) (holding that Washington apple growers stated common law disparagement claim
against broadcaster of program on use of Alar on U.S. apples, because "broadcast was clearly 'of and
concerning' [Alar]-laced apples").
168. See Cranberg v. Consumers Union, 756 F.2d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that Texas law
allows defamation claims to go forvard even where plaintiff is not mentioned by name "on the
grounds that a false publication concerning a business or product could tend to injure the reputation
of the company's owner by subjecting him to financial injury"); Auvil, 800 F. Supp. 928 (allowing
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disparagement was that Alar, a suspected carcinogen, was used on
seventy percent of all apples and that consumers could not tell which
apples were exposed to Alar.169 The court held that these statements were
"'of and concerning' all apples whether treated with Alar or not"'7 and
noted that "not only were apples specifically referenced, but all apples
were targeted as suspect even if Alar-free [and] Plaintiffs represent that
only about 10% of Washington apples were treated with Alar during the
relevant time frame."'' This holding is consistent with the fact that, by
definition, product disparagement must be "of and concerning" the
product, rather than the plaintiff.'72
To require producers harmed by disparaging statements to prove that
the statements were "of and concerning" their specific product-for
example, John Doe's eggs, rather than eggs in general-would unfairly
deny a remedy to plaintiffs who could otherwise meet the stringent proof
requirements of the state product disparagement laws. Under this
rationale, a plaintiff meeting all proof requirements could recover for
damages resulting from the disparagement that "plaintiff's apples kill
humans," but could not if the statement was that "all apples kill humans,"
regardless of the pecuniary damages caused. This rationale could expose
producers to potentially enormous uncompensated losses, and ignores the
stringent proof requirements of product disparagement claims.1"
The Auvil case demonstrates the potential enormity of damages that
negative statements about products can cause. The court characterized
the extreme damages allegedly caused by the "60 Minutes" broadcast as
follows:
[G]rowers and others dependent upon apple production sustained
tremendous losses amounting to perhaps as much as $75 million
dollars [sic]. Beyond immediate economic loss, growers forced into
bankruptcy or work-out arrangements with lenders lost their homes
and livelihoods. Those who survived intact saw their property
common law disparagement claim by Washington State apple growers to move forward because
court found that allegedly disparaging statement were "of and concering" the plaintiffs' products).
169. 800 F. Supp. at 934-35.
170. Id. at 935.
171. Id. at 935 nA.
172. Id. at 934 ("Imhe fact that no grower was identified seems an idle point. Plaintiffs are not
suing because they were defamed. They are suing because their product was disparaged.").
173. See Langvardt, supra note 18, at 957-58; see also infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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values nosedive. Entire communities dependent upon the apple
market were thrown into depression. 74
The Auvil plaintiffs were unable to prove common law disparagement
because they could not meet their burden of proof on falsity.'75 However,
the case demonstrates the stringency of disparagement's proof elements
and why the cause of action is necessary for those who can meet the
elements.'76 To require product disparagement plaintiffs to prove a
specific reference to their ownership of the disparaged product would
create a dangerous loophole for competitors or others wishing to use
false statements to harm producers or product markets.'77
B. The Commercial Speech Distinction Suggests Reduced Protection
in Many Product Disparagement Cases
Product disparagement by definition will involve damage to
commercial interests, such as the vendibility of a producer's products,
even where the speech is non-commercial. In this respect, the Supreme
Court's creation of separate categories for commercial and non-
commercial speech argues in favor of viewing product disparagement as
distinct from, rather than similar to, defamation. Most of the defamation
cases resulting in expanded First Amendment protections arose in the
context of government officials suing disseminators of critical
statements. Yet, the extreme deference to free speech on political issues,
even where that criticism may contain false statements, does not logically
extend as far in the context of product disparagement. False speech
relating to perishable products is more likely to do harm than good, and
statements about the safety of food products are more amenable to proof
of falsity than are political views.
174. Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 930-3 1.
175. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 836 F. Supp. 740, 741 (E.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd, 67 F.3d 816
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 (1996).
176. This argument extends to the majority of state product disparagement laws because those
laws retain the common law proof requirements of product disparagement. See supra Parts L.A & II.
The fact that a statutory cause of action is just as difficult to prove as a common law action was
demonstrated in Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, wherein the judge threw out the statutory product
disparagement claim. No. 2:96-CV-208-J, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3559, at *19-20 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 26, 1998).
177. See Langvardt, supra note 18, at 957; Cass R. Sunstein, Even Beef Can Be Libeled, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 22, 1998, at A29.
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Although there are strong arguments that free speech about consumer
safety issues should be unlimited, the public arguably has a stronger
interest in ensuring that statements about product safety, particularly
those used in the advertising context, are grounded in fact. As the
Supreme Court has noted:
Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even
wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no
obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem. The First
Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State
from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely.'78
Knowingly false statements of fact, particularly those made solely to
promote the speaker's economic interests, do not promote a public
interest.
The recent cases brought under state product disparagement laws
demonstrate that commercial and non-commercial speech are equally
likely to be the subjects of state product disparagement claims. For
example, in the two suits under the Texas product disparagement law,
cattle ranchers sued Oprah Winfrey and others over non-commercial
statements about U.S. beef, and emu ranchers sued Honda for statements
made in an advertisement.'79 Because of the distinct constitutional
protections afforded non-commercial as opposed to commercial
speech, 8' the context in which the disparaging statements are made must
be an important aspect of any constitutional analysis. As a result, where
commercial speech is the subject of a state product disparagement suit,
courts should afford such speech no more protection from state
restriction than it has received in the defamation context.' 8'
Whether the disparaging speech is made in a commercial or non-
commercial setting, the laws do not create a previously unavailable
weapon against speech about consumer safety issues, as commentators
have suggested.'82 "Generic" disparagement suits were brought before
178. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976) (citations omitted).
179. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part m.B.
181. See supra Part Irl.B.
182. See Bederman, supra note 2, at 168.
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these states codified the common law tort. 83 Additionally, the only
statutory claim to reach trial went to the jury on a claim other than the
statutory cause of action." Repealing these laws will not necessarily free
potential disparagement defendants from unwanted litigation.
V. STATE PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT LAWS MAY BE A
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD FOR POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs bringing statutory disparagement actions face not only the
stringent proof requirement noted above, but also the potential for
ongoing negative publicity exceeding that generated by the
disparagement. As the defense attorney for CBS in Auvil v. CBS "60
Minutes""' noted, "The plaintiff in a well-publicized libel suit always
has a lot more to lose than to gain.... What they're doing is re-ringing
the bell, reminding the public of the possibility of danger."'8 6 The Texas
Beef Growers case also produced more detailed public information on
the cattle industry's past practice of feeding animal byproducts to cattle
than the television show that generated the suit.'87 The double-edged
nature of such suits is demonstrated by the "McLibel" trial in England,
where McDonalds sued vegetarian activists for libel.'88 McDonalds won
a judgment only after enduring a trial that lasted nearly three years and
cost it over ten million dollars.'89 Despite this "win," the English news
media focused almost exclusively on the few statements that the court
had found not libelous.'90 This is not a promising track record for
potential plaintiffs under the state product disparagement laws.
183. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 836 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd, 67 F.3d
816 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 (1996).
184. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
185. 836 F. Supp. 740.
186. Oprah Takes the Bull by the Horns, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 26, 1998, at 15, 15
(quoting Bruce Johnson).
187. Compare Chip Chandler, Trial's 3rd Week Reaches Its End with Stern Warning From Judge
(visited Feb. 12, 1998) <http://www.amarillonet.comlstories/020/98/022-3273.OOIshtml>, with
Oprah's Report on Mad Cow Disease, Show Transcript, Apr. 15, 1996 (visited Feb. 12, 1998)
<http:/wvw.environlink.org/mcspotlight/mediatelevision/opratranscript.html>.
188. Ralph T. King, Jr., U.K. Court Says Activists Libeled McDonalds, Asian Wall St. J., June 20,
1997, at 2.
189. The McLibel Trial: Ronald Rides Again, The Guardian, June 20, 1997, at 7, available in
1997 WL 2387156.
190. See supra note 188; see also Sarah Lyall, Her Majesty's Court Has Ruled; McDonald's
Burgers Are Not Poison, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1997, at D7. ("[W]hile awarding the burger giant
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VI. CONCLUSION
The statutory product disparagement laws are no more likely to
restrict speech on food safety concerns than are constitutionalized
defamation laws. Requiring that statements of fact be based on some
degree of scientific or other reliable evidence promotes the public's
access to critical and accurate consumer information. Because the
majority of product disparagement statutes have proof requirements
consistent with those required by the First Amendment in the defamation
context, it is unnecessary to create additional protections for those laws.
Mandating higher proof requirements would deny a remedy to producers
damaged by knowingly false statements about the quality of their
products. Given the limited use of the product disparagement statutes to
date, and their limited potential for future use, there is little basis for
fearing that these statutes will be used widely to chill free speech.
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children through its advertising, and depressing wages in the British fast-food industry.").
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APPENDIX: ELEMENTS OF STATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR
PERISHABLE FOOD PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT' 9'
State Fault Standard Possible Plaintiffs Bearer of the Damages
Burden of
Proof
AL No express fault Producers, Not stated Actual damages and
standard; may marketers, or other (not limited to
deem falsity sellers compensatory)
AZ Malice or with Producers, Not stated Actual damages and
intent to harm shippers, or their other
associations
FL Willful or Producers or their Not stated Actual damages and
malicious associations other
dissemination and
knew or should
have known false
GA Willful or Anyone damaged, Not stated Actual damages and
malicious from grower to other
dissemination; consumer
may deem falsity
ID Actual malice and Producers whose Plaintiff, by Actual pecuniary
negligent specific product clear and damages only
disregard for harm has been convincing
to plaintiff disparaged standard
LA Knew or should Producers Not stated Actual damages and
have known false; other
may presume
falsity
MS Knowingly false; Producers Not stated Actual damages and
may presume other
falsity
ND Willful or Producers, Not stated Actual damages and
purposeful distributors, other; treble damages
dissemination and manufacturers where maliciously
knowingly false disseminated
191. See supra Part II.
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State Fault Standard Possible Plaintiffs Bearer of the Damages
Burden of
Proof
OH Knew or should Anyone damaged, Plaintiff Actual damages and
have known false from growers to other, treble damages
sellers if done with intent to
harm
OK Knew or should Producers Not stated Actual damages and
have known false other
SD Knowingly false Producers Not stated Actual damages and
other, treble damages
if done with intent to
harm
TX Knowingly false Producers Not stated Actual damages and
other
